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Abstract
Policy evaluation studies, which intend to assess the effect of an intervention, face some sta-
tistical challenges: in real-world settings treatments are not randomly assigned and the analysis
might be further complicated by the presence of interference between units. Researchers have
started to develop novel methods that allow to manage spillover mechanisms in observational
studies; recent works focus primarily on binary treatments. However, many policy evaluation
studies deal with more complex interventions. For instance, in political science, evaluating
the impact of policies implemented by administrative entities often implies a multivariate
approach, as a policy towards a specific issue operates at many different levels and can be
defined along a number of dimensions. In this work, we extend the statistical framework
about causal inference under network interference in observational studies, allowing for a
multi-valued individual treatment and an interference structure shaped by a weighted network.
The estimation strategy is based on a joint multiple generalized propensity score and allows
one to estimate direct effects, controlling for both individual and network covariates. We follow
the proposed methodology to analyze the impact of the national immigration policy on the
crime rate. We define a multi-valued characterization of political attitudes towards migrants
and we assume that the extent to which each country can be influenced by another country is
modeled by an appropriate indicator, summarizing their cultural and geographical proximity.
Results suggest that implementing a highly restrictive immigration policy leads to an increase
of the crime rate and the estimated effects is larger if we take into account interference from
other countries.
Keywords: causal inference; interference; complex network; multi-valued treatment; multiple
network exposure; immigration policy
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Policy evaluation studies aim to assess the effect of an intervention. Social sciences such as economics
or political science often evaluate complex interventions, which have not been randomly assigned in
the population. In some real-world settings, the analysis can be further complicated by the presence
of interference between units. This phenomenon occurs because both economic and social agents
are interconnected. Firms are connected by a wide mixture of juridical or commercial relationships
including trading links, ownership or control ties and strategic alliances (Reinert et al., 2009).
On the other side, individuals also interact through various mechanisms involving friendship or
parental links, working collaborations or informative communications. In addition, even political
entities are linked by way of explicit or velled agreements, or according to their specific geographical
and cultural collocation with respect to a reference environment. These relations are depicted by
a network : the observed nodes are the elements of the population of interest, while network links
represent the relations between them. Causal inference on a population of agents who are connected
through a network faces some statistical challenges, including how to take into account the spillover
mechanism that may arise. The typical causal inference framework (Rubin, 1980) relies on a key
assumption, called Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), which rules out the presence
of interference among units. However, if agents are linked, experiments as well as observational
studies may be affected by the presence of interference, which formally occurs when the treatment
of one unit has an effect on the response of other units (in addition to the unit’s own outcome) (Cox,
1958). In the presence of interference, the causal effect of a treatment on one unit may be altered
by the treatment received by other interfering units. For example, incentives targeted to some
firms or companies may also benefit all those firms that are linked to them, according to juridical
or economic relationships. In addition, policies implemented by single administrative entities also
affect the outcomes of interfering territories. Dealing with interference is of paramount importance:
wrongly assuming SUTVA can introduce a significant bias in the estimates and, consequently, lead
to deceptive conclusions about the real effect of an intervention.
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1.2 Related Works
For this reason, in recent years, a growing community of statisticians has started reasoning about
interconnected units, developing novel methods and techniques which allow to account for inter-
ference in causal inference studies. The existing works extend the standard framework to include
the network information in the definition of individual potential outcomes. Most of these works
examine interference in randomized trials. The limitations of the present statistical tools in dealing
with possible dependencies among units have been first pointed out by Rosenbaum (2007), who
has also developed non-parametric tests to evaluate treatment and spillover effects in the presence
of interference. This last study was extended, after a few years, by Aronow (2012), who presented
a novel method to detect interference, and by Bowers et al. (2013), who proposed tools to model
various dependency scenarios, also showing how to test hypotheses about causal effects according to
the specific model that is supposed to depict interference. Recently, Aronow et al. (2017) rearranged
the Horwitz-Thompson estimator allowing for the presence of interference to obtain unbiased es-
timators for all the effects of interest, main and spillovers. Athey et al. (2018) computed exact
p-values for a variety of sharp null hypotheses about treatment effect in an experimental design
where units are connected in an observed network. Interference may even play a role in the design
of experiments. Having proved that wrongly assuming SUTVA leads to biased results, Eckles et al.
(2017) formalized a model of experiments in networks, proposing novel techniques for reducing this
bias directly through the experimental design itself. Some other works focus on a particular type
of interference known as partial (clustered) interference, where units belong to exogenous groups
and the spillover mechanism can occur only within clusters. The term ”partial” is used here to
counterpoise this scheme of clustered dependencies with the ”general” interference scenario, where
units interact according to a network. The partial interference assumption was formally introduced
by Sobel (2006) and it was further advanced also by Hudgens and Halloran (2008), who investigated
the role of interference in the spreading of infectious diseases, where the probability that a person
becomes infected is lower if the proportion of vaccinated individuals in his group is high (Basse and
Feller, 2018). Moreover, Barkley et al. (2017) addressed the issue of a possible treatment selection
among connected individuals and proposed causal estimands allowing for clustered dependence in
the treatment selection (Papadogeorgou et al., 2019). There are just a few articles that explicitly
deal with general interference in observational studies. For instance, Hong and Raudenbush (2006)
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evaluated the policy of retaining low-achieving children in kindergarten rather than promoting them
to first grade, using a multilevel propensity score model. van der Laan (2014) and Sofrygin and
van der Laan (2017) proposed a targeted minimum loss-based estimation (TMLE) estimator. A
propensity score approach under spillover effects was first introduced by Forastiere et al. (2016),
who presented a reworked formalization of the standard propensity score, named joint propensity
score (JPS), with the aim of estimating the dose-response function in presence of interference. This
work analyzes a binary treatment and models interference through an observed binary network.
This last framework was employed by Del Prete et al. (2019) to explore trade distortions in agri-
cultural markets: here the authors in turn rearranged the JPS formulation in order to model a
continuous individual treatment.
1.3 Contribution
The existing statistical literature tackling interference in observational studies deals with binary
or continuous treatments only. However, many policy evaluation studies involve more complex
treatments, as, for example, treatments which are defined over more than two categories, known as
multi-valued treatments. Multi-valued treatments are highly diffused in nature. They are commonly
used when the empirical aim consists in comparing various characterizations of an intervention
and, above all, they are particularly employed in studies yearning to get the picture of complex and
many-faceted phenomena, which may vary across multiple dimensions. For instance, evaluating
the impact of different political attitudes towards puzzling macro-themes (immigration, national
healthcare, economy) often calls for a multi-valued approach and requires also to account for
interference, since the treatment may spill over to different political entities. Since our empirical
attempt is to evaluate the impact of immigration policy, we expand the theoretical framework
proposed by Forastiere et al. (2016) to the case of an individual multi-valued treatment, in observa-
tional studies. Generalization of the standard techniques (such as subclassification and propensity
score methods) for binary treatments to the multi-valued scenario is not straight-forward and
requires additional assumptions (Lopez et al. (2017); Yang et al. (2016); Linden et al. (2016)). The
methodological approach becomes even more complicated if we decide to allow for the presence
of interference, relaxing SUTVA and allowing for first-order spillover effects. The key idea is
that under a multi-valued treatment, in the presence of interference, each unit is individually
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assigned to a treatment level and, simultaneously, they can be exposed to all the treatment levels,
due to the interaction with their neighbors. Therefore, units experiment a multiple neighborhood
exposure, where each of their neighbors contributes in increasing the exposure to his own individual
treatment level. In addition, the multiple neighborhood exposure mapping accounts for weights,
which quantify the extent of dependencies, if they are observable. Weighted networks are widely
spread in real-world data. For instance, networks of transactions between entities are usually
enriched by the information about transactions’ amount, social networks sometimes are coupled
with the strength of friendship between units, scientific collaborations networks often provide
the number of collaborations, political networks frequently measure the strength of connections
between administrative and political entities by specific indicators. In settings with multi-valued
treatments and weighted network, each unit is exposed to an individual treatment, which is
categorical with a given number of categories, and to a neighborhood treatment, which is a
multivariate continuous variable that measures the unit exposure to all treatment levels, resulting
from the interaction of their neighbors and given the strength of these interactions. Since we move
in an observational study setting, where neither the individual treatment nor the neighborhood
treatment are randomly assigned in the population, we propose an estimation strategy based
on the usage of an extended version of the joint propensity score proposed by Forastiere et al.
(2016). Our definition of propensity score, that we call Joint Multiple Generalized Propensity Score
(JMGPS), allows to handle a multi-valued treatment and a multiple neighborhood exposure. The
JMGPS is a type of generalized propensity score (Hirano and Imbens, 2004), where the estimation
strategy relies on a three-stage approach: i) we first assume a parametric distribution for both the
individual and the neighborhood treatment and for the outcome variable; ii) for all the possible
values that the joint treatment can assume, we use these models to predict missing potential
outcomes; iii) we estimate the effects of interest comparing potential outcomes, and use bootstrap
to compute the estimated standard errors.
We make use of this methodology for the analysis of the causal effect of immigration policies on
crime rates. In the last decades, the relevance of the immigration process has rapidly grown and shew
the way to the spreading of a wide and open debate about the effects of migration. Some political
parties, single politicians and citizens all around the world do believe that immigration represents
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a risk for national identity and, moreover, that it leads to a lower public safety. Consequently,
they support governments that implement restrictive immigration policies. However, the causal
effect of immigration policies on crime or social conditions in general has not been tested yet. In
particular, there are not quantitative studies that involve and compare many countries, over a wide
time frame. We analyze policies using the IMPIC (Immigration Policies in Comparison) dataset
that numerically measures all the immigration policies that have been implemented in the OECD
countries from 1980 and 2010 in terms of restrictiveness. We include in the analysis 22 OECD
countries that are located in Europe over the whole time frame covered by the IMPIC dataset.
Our purpose is to investigate the impact of a national towards migrants on the crime rate. In
this application, the treatment of interest represents the restrictiveness of immigration policies,
which is measured in the IMPIC Dataset through the evaluation of a series of single policies. Each
policy refers to regulations or control protocols. The former are all the binding legal provisions
that create or constrain rights (Helbling et al. (2017)), while the latter refer to the directives that
have been adopted with the aim of monitoring whether the regulations are observed. Therefore, by
aggregating items referring to these two political dimensions, we obtain two indicators measuring the
country-year restrictiveness towards migrants, with respect to regulations and control mechanisms
separately. Using this information, we define a multi-valued treatment by looking at the joint value
of the two indicators, for each country-year profile. In this empirical setting, SUTVA is unlikely to
hold. The political strategy towards migrants that a single country decides to implement may also
affect crime rate of other countries. The possible spillover effect of the adopted political attitude
towards immigration arises because migrants try to avoid countries with highly restrictive laws,
and tend to move to states that appear to be more welcoming. Since migrants tend to move to
countries with specific characteristics of their choice, the extent to which each country is affected by
other countries’ policies depends on their level of similarity. Following this intuition, we derive an
indicator summarizing the main factors which may prompt the spillover mechanism. These factors
refer to various measures of similarity, which we reasonably believe to be the primary mechanisms
driving interference. Specifically, this index, that we call Influence Index (II), gives a measure of
potential interference between each pair of countries at a given year and combines information about
geographical proximity and cultural similarity, which in turn are summarized by specific indicators.
This work is organized as follows. In Section 2 we focus on methodology. We first summarize the
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existing causal inference framework under interference in observational studies and then we present
our methodological novelties: we introduce a multi-valued treatment and we propose a novel tool
that allows one to model the neighborhood exposure in the presence of multi-valued treatment and
weighted interference. We introduce the joint generalized multiple propensity score and we illustrate
the estimation strategy. In Section 3 we motivate the importance of the empirical application,
giving a broad overview of the existing literature and briefly describing data. Moreover, we give a
more detailed characterization of the Influence Index and we provide a deeper explanation on the
definition of treatment nominal categories. In Section 4 we present the main empirical results. Then,
in the appendix, we collect the proofs of the theoretical propositions we present in Section 2, we
give the precise definition of II also adding further details about the definition of the neighborhood
treatment variable, and we present the detailed results of all the models we implement, reporting
some descriptives and checking the robustness of the main findings with respect to alternative
definitions of the treatment variable.
2 Methodology
In this section we explain the main methodological developments. We start from the existing causal
inference framework under interference and then we present the novel approach for multi-valued
treatments (Subsection 2.1). Finally, we define the Joint Multiple Generalized Propensity Score
(Subsection 2.2) together with its properties and we propose the estimation strategy (Subsection
2.3).
2.1 Causal Inference Under Network Interference
The main scope of causal inference is estimating the effect of a treatment on some outcome variable
in a population of units. Let us consider a sample N composed of N units. Denote as K the number
of treatment levels and let Zi ∈ {1, . . . ,K} be a categorical variable representing the treatment
assigned to unit i and Y obsi the observed outcome for the same unit. By Z and Y
obs we denote the
corresponding vectors of the whole sample N . Moreover, Xi denotes a vector of P covariates (or
pre-treatment variables) that are not influenced by the treatment assignment. Following Rubin
(1974, 1980), we postulate, for each unit, the existence of K potential outcomes, one for each
treatment vector, Yi(Z). Most causal inference relies on the Stable Units Treatment Assumption
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(SUTVA) (Rubin, 1986). SUTVA consists of two different components: (i) the Individualistic
Treatment Response (ITR) (Manski, 2013) (or no interference) assumption, which states that
there is no interference between units, each unit’s potential outcomes are defined only by the
unit’s own treatment; (ii) the consistency (or no multiple version of the treatment) assumption,
which states that there are no different versions of the treatment levels. As a consequence,
under SUTVA, potential outcomes can be indexed only by Zi -i.e Yi(Zi)- and the observed out-
come is the one corresponding to the treatment that each unit i has actually received: Y obsi = Yi(Zi).
SUTVA completely rules out the presence of interference among units. However, in many real
situations, this no-interference assumption is violated. This phenomenon can occur in various and
heterogeneous frameworks. For instance, in economics, firms assigned to a program of incentives can
be affected by incentives received by other firms. In epidemics, vaccines are known to benefit the
whole community, including unprotected individuals, because they reduce the reservoir of infection
and the infectiousness. Finally, in political sciences, policies implemented in some administrative
regions may have an effect also on neighboring territories. All these examples refer to empirical situ-
ations in which one unit’s outcome may be influenced by other units’ treatment level. Figure 1 gives
a graphical intuition of interference. In the no-interference case, each unit’s outcome (red nodes) is
affected only by his own treatment (blue nodes); in the presence of interference, neighboring units’
treatments also affect the individual outcome.
(a) No interference scenario (b) With Interference scenario
Figure 1: No-Interference vs Interference scenarios: blue nodes represent individual treatments, red
nodes their corresponding outcomes.
When the spillover mechanism comes into play, wrongly assuming SUTVA leads to biased results
and, consequently, to inaccurate or even misleading conclusions about the effects of interest. In order
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to model interference, we must look at the relationships between units. We consider an observed
undirected network G = (N ,E), where N is the set of nodes (the population of interest) and E
represents the set of edges indicating links between nodes. For each node i, we identify a partition
of N into two subsets: i) the neighborhood of node i, Ni, that includes all the nodes j with a link
with node i, i↔ j, and we denote by Ni the cardinality of Ni; ii) the No-Neighborhood of node i,
N−i, including all the nodes j without a link with node i, i= j. According to these partitions, we
define, for each node i, the following partitions of the treatment vector and of the outcome vector,
(Zi,ZNi ,ZN−i), (Yi,YNi ,YN−i). Figure 2 shows the neighborhood of a given node.
Figure 2: Neighborhood of a given node: the figure shows a given unit (yellow-colored unit) and
highlights his own neighbors (red-colored units), in a population of connected agents.
Admitting network interference in the analysis implies the replacement of SUTVA by an as-
sumption on the interference structure. Forastiere et al. (2016) make a neighborhood interference
assumption, which allows for the existence of first-order spillover effects between neighbors, in the
context of binary treatments. More precisely, using the notation Yi(Z) for potential outcomes of
unit i, we have:
Assumption 1 (Stable Unit Treatment on Neighborhood Value Assumption (SUTNVA) ). SUT-
NVA is constituted by two components:
1. No Multiple Versions of Treatment ( Consistency): Yi(Z) = Yi(Z
1) ∀Z,Z1 such that Z = Z1,
that is, the mechanism used to assign the treatments does not matter.
2. Neighborhood Interference: There exists a function gi : {0, 1}Ni → G, with G⊂R such that,
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for all ZN−i ,Z
1
N−i and ZNi ,Z
1
Ni with gi(ZNi) = gi(Z
1
Ni), we have
Yi(Zi,ZNi ,ZN−i) = Yi(Zi,Z
1
Ni ,Z
1
N−i).
This assumption basically states that there is interference and it is modelled by the function
gi.
The variable Gi = gi(ZNi), called neighborhood treatment, represents the units exposure to the
treatment, due to the influence of his neighbors. The function gi can be defined in many different
ways, according to the interference mechanism that is assumed to take place. For instance, it
can simply count the number of treated neighbors or it can measure the proportion of treated
neighbors. Note that under SUTNVA interference is assumed to arise only from neighborhood of
each unit and that any higher order interference is completely ruled out. This means that unit i is
not influenced by units other than their neighbors. This restriction over the interference structure
may appear to be strong in some scenarios, but it seems to be plausible in many empirical
applications.
In many real-world applications treatments are implicitly or explicitly multi-valued. In
epidemics, researchers are interested in comparing between drugs (Linden et al., 2016). In
economics, firms are exposed to different types of incentives. In training programs, participants
receive different types of coaching (Cattaneo, 2010). Finally, political scientists evaluate political
strategies towards highly complex and multi-faceted issues which involve different sub-fields. In
such scenarios, a common practice is to collapse the multi-valued treatment into a binary variable,
but this approach implies a relevant loss in terms of information and it prevents the possibility of
capturing differential effects across treatment levels (Cattaneo, 2010). For this reason, researchers
have started to study how to extract causal information under multi-valued treatments, developing
novel assumptions and techniques that extend to the multi-valued scenario standard causal
inference methods as matching, subclassification, inverse probability weighting on the propensity
score (Lopez et al., 2017). However, no existing work suggests how to deal with interference in the
multi-valued scenario. In this work we fill in this gap.
Under first-order spillover effects, each unit is exposed to a neighborhood treatment, defined as
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a numerical synthesis neighbors’ treatment status. In the binary setting, this synthesis is usually
expressed by a single value, Gi ∈ G⊂R, while when the individual treatment is defined by multiple
categories this definition of Gi is too simplistic. Categorical treatments imply a more complex
definition of the neighborhood treatment exposure, as the neighborhood treatment must summarize
the individual network exposure to each treatment level. The mathematical tool that we introduce
to model the neighborhood treatment under multi-valued individual treatment is the Neighborhood
Treatment Exposure Matrix G:
Definition 1 (Neighborhood Treatment Exposure Matrix (NTEM), G). The NTEM is an N ×K
matrix G that collects the unit neighborhood exposure to all the treatment levels:
G =

G1,1 . . . G1,z . . . G1,K
...
...
...
...
...
Gi,1 . . . Gi,z . . . Gi,K
...
...
...
...
...
GN,1 . . . GN,z . . . GN,K

.
Each element Gi,z ∈ G⊂R indicates the exposure of unit i to the treatment level z ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
Each row is the neighborhood treatment vector for the unit i, Gi ∈ GK⊂RK . Therefore, the neigh-
borhood treatment is not a scalar measure, as in the binary treatment setting. It is instead a K-
dimensional vector whose components describe the unit’s neighborhood exposure to each treatment
level.
Hence, the first component of the recalled SUTNVA for binary treatments, i.e. the no multi-
ple versions of treatment assumption, is confirmed as stated above; while the second component,
i.e. the neighborhood interference assumption, is here replaced by a more general assumption, which
handles the spillover mechanism generated by a multi-valued individual treatment:
Assumption 2 (Multiple Neighborhood Interference). There exists a function gi : {1, . . . ,K}Ni →
GK , with GK⊂RK , such that, for all ZN−i ,Z1N−i and ZNi ,Z1Ni with gi(ZNi) = gi(Z1Ni), we have
Yi(Zi,ZNi ,ZN−i) = Yi(Zi,Z
1
Ni ,Z
1
N−i).
This assumption states that interference is modelled by the function gi (with components gi,z, z ∈
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{1, . . . ,K}) which maps the neighborhood exposure of unit i over a K-variate domain, that is
Gi = gi(ZNi).
If interference is modeled through a weighted network, the function gi must take into account
the weights, Iij , measuring the strength of the link between i and the neighbor j. For instance,
given an individual treatment with K categories, we can set Gi,z =
∑
j∈Ni Iijδzj , where δzj is a
dummy variable that equals 1 if Zj = z and 0 otherwise.
Each unit i is exposed to a joint treatment (Zi,Gi): the individual treatment Zi, which
is a categorical variable with K levels and the neighborhood multi-treatment Gi which is a
K-variate variable. Hence, potential outcomes, for each unit i, are indexed by the joint treatment:
Yi(Zi,Gi) = Yi(Zi = z,Gi = g). The observed outcome is the one corresponding to the actual
joint treatment each unit is exposed to: Y obsi = Yi(Zi,Gi).
Regarding the effects of interest, the number of the possible comparisons is
(
K
2
)
= K!(K−2)!2! .
Under the multi-valued individual treatment, the direct effect of a given treatment z′ with respect
to the treatment z, keeping the neighborhood treatment as fixed, can be expressed as
τz′z(g) = E
[
Yi(z
′,g)− Yi(z,g)
]
. (1)
This quantity represents the individual causal effect of a direct exposure, when the neighborhood
treatment is set to g. The overall main effect can be define averaging the individual treatment effect
over the multivariate probability distribution of the neighborhood treatment, that is
τz′z =
∑
g∈GK
τz′z(g)P (Gi = g). (2)
2.2 Joint Multiple Generalized Propensity Score (JMGPS)
In this work, we focus on observational studies, where neither the individual nor the neighborhood
treatment are randomly assigned in the population. The general strategy in observational studies
is to control for baseline covariates such that, conditioning on them, the treatment assignment
becomes as good as random. In other words, we can exclude any dependence between treatment
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variable and potential outcomes. This assumption is known as unconfoundness (Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1983). In some empirical applications, the number and nature of covariates makes it hard to
control for all of them without relying on strong parametric assumptions and, extrapolating in these
settings, researchers, instead of conditioning on the set of covariates, prefer to work with a scalar
synthesis of them, called propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). In the binary treatment
setting with no interference, propensity score is defined as the conditional probability of receiving
the treatment, given the values of the covariates. If the unconfoundness assumption is valid when
conditioning on individual covariates, it remains valid when conditioning on the propensity score.
Using this approach, researchers benefit from a relevant dimensionality reduction in the analysis.
This general approach, which is well grounded in the standard causal inference literature, can be
extended to the setting with multi-valued treatment and interference. Here the unconfoundness
assumption must be related to the joint treatment and the joint potential outcomes. Following the
motivations proposed by Yang et al. (2016), we rely on the weaker version of unconfoundness with
respect to the individual multi-valued treatment. Hence, instead of considering the actual multi-
valued treatment variable Zi, we refer to K treatment indicator variables representing the presence
( or absence ) of a given treatment level z, Di(z). Thus, we advance the following assumption:
Assumption 3 (Weak Unconfoundedness of the Joint Treatment).
P (Di(z) = 1, Gi = g |Yi(z, g),Xi) = P (Di(z) = 1, Gi = g |Xi) ∀z ∈ {1, . . . ,K} ∀g ∈ GK .
Note that, in presence of interference, Xi can include purely individual covariates as well as
neighborhood covariates. From now on, we denote as Xindi the individual covariates and as X
neigh
i
the neighborhood covariates.
In the presence of interference, the propensity score is the joint probability of receiving a value
z of the individual treatment and, simultaneously, being exposed to a value g of the neighbor-
hood treatment, given the unit’s baseline covariates. Forastiere et al. (2016) formally introduced
propensity score under network interference in the case of a binary treatment. We expand their defi-
nition allowing for a multi-valued individual treatment and a multivariate neighborhood treatment.
Therefore, we introduce the Joint Multiple Generalized Propensity score (JMGPS) as follows:
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Definition 2 (Joint Multiple Generalized Propensity score (JMGPS) ). , ψ(z, g,x)
JMGPS is the probability of being jointly exposed to a K-variate individual treatment equal to z
and to a K-dimensional neighborhood treatment equal to g, conditioning on baseline covariates.
ψ(z, g;x) = P (Zi = z,Gi = g|Xi = x) (3)
As the standard propensity score, the Joint Multiple Generalized Propensity Score is a balancing
score, that is, it guarantees balance with respect to neighborhood and individual covariates. JMGPS
has the following properties.
Proposition 1 (Balancing Property of JMGPS ). The joint propensity score is a balancing score,
that is
P (Zi = z,Gi = g|Xi) = P (Zi = z,Gi = g|ψ(z, g;Xi)), ∀ z ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and ∀ g ∈ GK .
Proof in Appendix A.1
Furthermore, conditioning on JMGPS, we can exclude any dependency between the treatment
variable and potential outcomes.
Proposition 2 (Conditional Unconfoundedness of Di(z) and Gi given JMGPS ). Under Assump-
tion 3, for all z ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and g ∈ GK
P (Di(z) = 1, Gi = g |Yi(z, g), ψ(z, g;Xi)) = P (Di(z) = 1, Gi = g |ψ(z, g;Xi)).
Proof in Appendix A.2
Following Forastiere et al. (2016), we rely on the factorization of the joint propensity score in
neighborhood propensity score and individual propensity score.
Definition 3 (Factorization of the Joint Multiple Generalized Propensity score (JMGPS)). JMGPS
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can be factorized as follows
ψ(z, g;x) = P (Zi = z,Gi = g|Xi = x)
= P (Gi = g|Zi = z,Xgi = xg)P (Zi = z|Xzi = xz)
= λ(g; z,xg)φ(z;xz),
(4)
where λ(g; z,xg) is the neighborhood propensity score and φ(z;xz) is the individual propensity score.
Xzi and X
g
i are vectors collecting covariates that affect the individual and the neighborhood treat-
ment, respectively. Note that the two sets corresponding to the covariates included in Xzi and X
g
i
may differ. In particular, Xgi , can collect individual covariates as well as neighborhood covariates,
while Xzi includes individual variables only.
Using the factorization that we have just presented, we illustrate another key property of
JMGPS.
Proposition 3 (Conditional Unconfoundedness of Di(z) andGi given individual and neighborhood
propensity scores ). Under Assumption 3, for all z ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and g ∈ GK , we have
P (Di(z) = 1, Gi = g |Yi(z, g), φ(z;Xzi ), λ(g; z,Xi)) = P (Di(z) = 1, Gi = g |φ(z;Xzi ), λ(g; z,Xi)).
Proof in Appendix A.3
This property indicates that conditioning on the two components separately still guarantees the
validity of the conditional unconfoundness property.
2.3 Estimation Procedure
The JMGPS is the fundamental element of the estimation procedure that we propose here in this
section. Both its components can be seen as peculiar characterizations of the generalized propensity
score proposed by Hirano and Imbens (2004). This procedure follows a parametric approach and
imputes missing potential outcomes for all configurations of the joint treatment and then compares
them to estimate the direct effects of interest. Standard errors and confidence intervals are computed
using bootstrap methods. The proposed estimation strategy can be summarized in three main steps.
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1) Model treatment and outcome variables
(1.a) Assume a distribution for Zi, Gi and Yi.
Formally:
Zi ∼ fz(Xzi ; θz),
Gi ∼ fg(Zi,Xgi ; θg),
Yi(z, g) ∼ fy(z, g, φ(z;Xi), λ(g; z,Xi); θy).
Of course, the multi-valued characterization of Zi demands for the definition of a statistical model
for categorical responses, with respect to the individual propensity score model. Furthermore, Gi
requires the definition of a multivariate model.
(1.b) Predict actual individual and neighborhood propensity score
Estimate the parameters θz and θg of the models for Zi and Gi; Use the estimated parameters in
Step 1, θ̂z and θ̂g, to predict for each unit i ∈ N the actual individual propensity score and the
actual neighborhood propensity score, that is, the probabilities of being exposed to the individual
treatment and the multivariate neighborhood treatment they have actually being exposed to:
Φ̂i = φ(Zi;X
z
i ; θ̂
z),
Λ̂i = λ(Gi;Zi,X
g
i ; θ̂
g).
(1.c) Estimate parameters of the outcome model
Use the predicted propensity scores Φ̂i and Λ̂i, in order to estimate the parameters θ
y of the outcome
model Yi(z, g):
Yi ∼ fy(Zi,Gi, Φ̂i, Λ̂i; θy).
2) Impute Missing Potential Outcomes
Consider the domain of the joint treatment (Zi = z,Gi = g). In particular, Gi is a K-dimensional
continuous variable. For each possible value of the joint treatment, that is, for each combination
(Zi = z,Gi = g) s.t z ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, g ∈ Γ 1, with Γ ⊂ GK , and for each unit i ∈ N ,
(2.a) Predict the individual propensity score corresponding to that level of z, φ̂(z;Xzi ).
1In order to explore a multivariate domain, one common practice is constructing a K-dimensional discrete grid
that scours the possible values of g, over its K components’ respective domain. Let us denote this grid as Γ, Γ ⊂ GK .
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(2.b) Predict the neighborhood propensity score corresponding to that level of g, λ̂(g; z,Xgi ).
(2.c) Use that estimated parameters to impute the potential outcome Ŷi(z, g), that is,
Ŷi(z, g) ∼ fy(z, g, φ̂(z;Xzi ), λ̂(g; z,Xgi ); θ̂y).
3) Estimate the effects of interest and their corresponding variance
(3.a) Estimate the final direct effects of interest, averaging potential outcomes over λ(g; z,Xgi ):
τ̂z′z =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[∑
g∈Γ
(
Ŷi(z
′, g)− Ŷi(z, g)
)] λ̂(g; z,Xgi )∑
g′∈Γ λ̂(g
′; z,Xgi )
.
(3.b) Compute variance through bootstrap. This procedure works as follows. Choose a large value
R. For R times, r : {1, . . . , R}, draw a random sample Nr with replacement from N . Estimate the
effects of interest over the subsample Nr, so getting τ̂z′z(r). Consider the distribution of τ̂z′z(r) over
the R repetitions T̂ rz′z. The estimated standard error Std.Er(τ̂z′z) is the standard error of T̂
r
z′z.
3 Empirical Application
In this section, we focus on the empirical application. We first explain the relevance of our empir-
ical research question with respect to the existing literature about immigration (Subsection 3.1).
Second, we describe the different data sources that we have merged (Subsection 3.2). Finally, we
formalize and discuss the influence index (Subsection 3.3) and we explain how we derive the treat-
ment categories (Subsection 3.4) also showing how to implement the estimation strategy we have
presented in the previous section (Subsection 3.5).
3.1 Empirical Research Question
In the last decades, interest about immigration has rapidly grown, so that it has become a major
topic both in academic and real life debates (Helbling et al. (2017)). Immigration flows significantly
increased, since many people attempted to move away from countries which have been suffering
long periods of wars and bad economic conditions. The consequence of this process is that the
world has become multicultural: migrants have started to be socially included into the hosting
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countries, searching for a new job or even getting married. Moreover, migrants have diffused their
own social and religious beliefs. However, immigration has entailed not only positive outcomes.
Some countries which have embraced a relevant number of migrants, have experienced the rising
of social tensions (Rudolph (2003)). Over the last decades, economic conditions gradually get
worse: unemployment rates rose up, and real wages went down. In addition, people have noticed a
relevant worsening in the perception of individual security. The conviction that immigration may
have aggravated these negative processes has slowly taken root in the public opinion. Politicians
and common citizens have started to evaluate problematic consequences about immigration and
globalization. Concerns about migration spread up in three main directions. First, native people
perceive immigration as a risk for the preservation of national identity. Integration results to be not
always easy and multiculturalism tends to be perceived more as a threat than as an opportunity.
Second, as migrants move looking for better living conditions, they represent, in the common
belief, competitive profiles for job. Finally, people tend to blame migrants for raising crime (Bigo,
2002).
In recent years, many researchers have started studying the effects of the increasing migration
flows. For instance, Bove and Bo¨hmelt (2016) has assessed the effect of migration on the dif-
fusion of terrorism, while Rudolph (2006) has evaluated the effects on national security. Many
epidemiological studies as Polissar (1980), Stillman et al. (2007) and Hildebrandt and McKenzie
(2005) have analyzed the consequences on the spreading of some diseases and on public health,
in general. Furthermore, Coleman (2008) and Keely (2000) have studied the causal effect of
migration on some demographic outcomes. Bianchi et al. (2008) Bianchi et al. (2012) and
Stansfield (2016) have studied the impact of flows on crime. The existing works assessing the
causal link between migration flows and crime present findings which are conceptually in con-
trast to common perception, suggesting that increasing immigration flows does not lead to higher
crime rates. Some of them also state that there is actually a negative effect of immigration on crime.
The public discussion about migration has also involved the immigration policies that na-
tional governments implement with the aim of controlling and ruling the immigration process.
Brochmann and Hammar (1999) defined immigration policies as the ”governments statements of
what it intends to do or not do (including laws, regulations, decisions or orders) in regards to
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the selection, admission, settlement and deportation of foreign citizens residing in the country”.
These policies can be more or less restrictive and, therefore, can discourage or encourage migrants,
respectively. Some political parties of various countries all over the world support the idea
that implementing restrictive immigration policies limits the negative effects of migrations and,
consequently, leads to better living and economic conditions for the natives. On the other side,
many politicians and intellectuals argue that the legislative system of a country should encourage
immigrants and facilitate their settling.
In this work, we investigate the causal effect of immigration policies on crime rates. Specifi-
cally, we study the effect of the restrictiveness of the implemented immigration policy on one year
lagged national crime rate, expressed in terms of homicides every 10.000 inhabitants. We approach
this research question from a country level perspective: in particular, we focus on the subset of
OECD countries that are located in the Continental Europe and we inspect their policies towards
migrants from 1980 and 2010. These policies have been measured in terms of restrictiveness in the
IMPIC (Immigration Policies in Comparison) Dataset (Helbling et al. (2017), Schmid and Helbling
(2016)), that properly conceptualizes and quantitatively compares many national policies that af-
fect migrants (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002). Starting from the restrictiveness measures supplied by
the IMPIC Dataset and taking into account the conceptualization of the observed policies that the
same dataset proposes, we evaluate the national immigration policy over two political dimensions:
restrictiveness of regulations and restrictiveness of control strategies. From now on, we denote by
Reg and Cont the two variables representing those two dimensions. We present a treatment vari-
able that qualitatively distinguishes country-year profiles with respect to these two measures and
we pairwise compare different political strategies.
Our empirical analysis covers 22 OECD countries that are situated in the continental Europe 2.
These countries are characterized by very different immigration experiences: there are countries
that have experienced increasing immigration since one or two centuries (Great Britain, Germany,
France), countries that recently turned from emigration to immigration (Italy, Spain) and coun-
tries that have experienced very limited immigration (Finland) (Helbling et al., 2017). However,
they are still highly comparable from an institutional point of view, as they are all fully developed
224 OECD countries are located in the Continental Europe but we remove from the analysis Hungary and Estonia
as they present extreme values of the crime rate.
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democracies and are all located in Europe. In Figure 3 we show a map of the 22 countries included.
Figure 3: Included countries: red colored countries are the ones included in our analysis.
We believe that this is an innovative contribution to the existing literature about migration.
Indeed, there are just some recent studies (Geddes and Scholten (2016), Messina (2007)) about
immigration policies but they look at particular behaviors of individual countries or describe a
small number of countries (Helbling et al., 2017). Even if there are existing works that assess the
effects of migration flows on crime rates, they focus on single countries comparing subnational
administrative entities and they do not take into account the national political strategy towards
migrants. Moreover, they all rule out spillover effects.
In this empirical scenario, interference may play a relevant role. Migrants may choose to avoid
highly restrictive countries and to settle in places where laws appear to be more welcoming. But we
expect that they try to preserve some characteristics of their settling choice. Thus, the general idea
is that dependence between two countries is related to their level of similarity. We assume that two
mechanisms may drive interference: geographical proximity and cultural proximity. Thus, we build
a continuous indicator that analytically captures these driving mechanisms of interference. Each
component contributes according to a given weight. We test various configurations of the influence
weights in order to check the robustness of our results with respect to different restrictions about
dependencies.
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3.2 Data
This work merges different data sources. First, we use the IMPIC (Immigration Policies in
Comparison) Dataset (Helbling et al., 2017) that provides information about national immigration
policies. In particular, this dataset includes data on migration policies for all the OECD countries
over thirty years (from 1980 to 2010). Policies are measured with respect to their restrictiveness,
from 0 (less restrictive) to 1 (highly restrictive). Data include more than 50 policies for each
country-year profile and items are aggregated in different indicators of the general restrictiveness
towards migrants with respect to the regulation and control protocols. The former aspect is related
to all the laws that discipline immigrants and their life in the hosting country, while the latter is
referred to the mechanisms that help in monitoring whether the regulations are abided by (Schmid
and Helbling, 2016).
Second, we handle different datasets to assemble the Influence Index (II), which measures
the extent of dependency between each pair of countries at a given year, that is the extent to
which a country’s immigration policy influences the crime rate of another country. As we will fully
discuss in the forthcoming section, this index is a convex combination of two complex indicators
quantifying geographical proximity and cultural similarity between two countries at a given year.
We build up the geographical proximity indicator starting from the CEPII Dist Dataset (Mayer
and Zignago (2011)) which includes different measures of bilateral distances (in kilometers) and a
dummy variable denoting pairwise contiguity. Furthermore, we explore cultural similarity between
each pair of countries at a given year looking at the linguistic similarity through the CEPII
Language Dataset (Melitz and Toubal, 2014) and at the religious similarity through CEPII
Gravity Dataset (Fouquin et al., 2016).
Third, we make use of some datasets that provide country-year features. Specifically, we
collect information about crime rates relying on the World Countries Homicide rate dataset which
comprises information about the country-year specific number of homicides per 10.000 inhabitants.
In addition, we manage the World Development Indicators dataset, provided by the World Bank
(Coppedge et al. (2018a), Lindberg et al. (2014) and Coppedge et al. (2018b)) which contains
highly detailed country-year indicators referring to various aspects of society: they quantitatively
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mark out the economic situation, the demographic features, the state of the social welfare and
democracy and even the level of equality, freedom and justice.
The observed population is characterized by country-year observations: we deal with C = 22
countries observed over T = 30 years where the initial time t = 1 is year 1980 while the ending
time t = T is year 2010). 3. Therefore, the generic unit i is a pair (c, t) and the total number
of units is N = C × T . We indicate as Yobs = {Y obsct } the (N × 1) observed (country,year)
outcome vector. Furthermore, we take into account of the pre-treatment covariates matrix X
with dimension N × P : each row of this matrix represents a country-year observation, while
each column refers to a specific baseline factor. The included covariates can be grouped in four
sets, according to the main issue they refer to: i) Economy : GDP per capita, equal distribution
of resources index, state ownership of economy index; ii) Inequality : educational inequality index,
income inequality index, health equality index, power distributed to gender index, equal access;
iii) Freedom and Participation: civil participation index, freedom of expression index, freedom of
religion; iv) Demography : life expectancy, fertility rate. We denote as X the set collecting these
variables.
We point out that we assume that there is a one-year lag effect of baseline covariates on
treatment and of treatment on outcome variables. We state that the covariates of one country c
at time t affects his individual as well as neighborhood treatment at time t+ 1 and that the joint
treatment in turn affects the outcomes at time t+2. Figure 4 provides an intuition of this conceptual
idea.
Figure 4: Variables Effects: timing
3Estonia starts to be included in the analysis from 1991, after its Independence. Czech Republic and Slovak are
instead considered only from 1993: they both became independent countries after the Dissolution of Czechoslovakia
which took effect on Jan 1, 1993.
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There is no way to test this assumption, but a lagged process of causation seems plausible in
the considered empirical scenario. In addition, in order to avoid reverse causality issues, in the
propensity score estimation we control for no-lagged outcome variables. For instance, we consider
the baseline covariates of one country at time t to model his joint treatment at time t + 1 and
consequently his outcome at time t + 2 and in the set of the pre-treatment variables at time t we
include the outcome at time t as well.
3.3 Modelling Interference: Influence Index (I)
Here, we must define the interference structure taking into account the possible mechanisms that
could make immigration policies in one country affecting the crime levels of other countries. The
idea is that immigrants avoid highly restrictive countries and settle to areas that are similar to the
first choice with respect to some characteristics, but more politically welcoming. Thus, the relevance
of spillover between each pair of countries depends on their pairwise similarity. We assume that the
kind of similarity that plays a role in this mechanism is the geographic proximity ( meaning, the
geographic distance between countries ) and the cultural similarity. In some sense, we state that
a migrant, who is willing to move, chooses the most welcoming alternative among the countries
that are relatively near and culturally similar to the first choice option, that though implements
highly restrictive laws. Therefore, we build up a composite indicator which numerically summarizes
these two mechanisms which we reasonably believe are the key prompters of dependency. The two
components contribute to the determination of the global index according to some weights, α and
β. This index, that we call Influence Index (I), gives a unique information about how much one
country c interfere with a country c′ at time t. Formally:
Definition 4 (Influence Index (I)).
Icc′,t = α× IGcc′ + β × ICcc′,t
where IGcc′ ∈ [0, 1] is the geographic proximity indicator which measures the geographical proximity
between country c and country c′ and ICcc′,t ∈ [0, 1] is the cultural similarity indicator that measures
the cultural similarity between two countries time t. The constants α and β, with α + β = 1, are
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the Influence Inputs Weights (IIW) that determine the extent to which each component contributes
to the global index.
Note that, since the Influence Index is a convex combination of two indicators bounded be-
tween 0 and 1, it is in turn bounded between 0 and 1, that is, Icc′,t ∈ [0, 1]. More details about the
construction of the Influence index can be found in the Appendix B. We test various allocations
of IIW to check the robustness of our results with respect to different assumptions over the in-
terference structure. Following the same approach of many existing works in economics and social
sciences (Del Prete et al. (2019)), we have ruled out the presence of intertemporal links, that is we
set I(ct),(c′t′) = 0 ∀c, c′, t, t′ with t 6= t′.
3.4 Treatment Categories
IMPIC dataset provides indicators which measure the country-year restrictiveness towards migrants
with respect to regulations and control mechanisms. Let us denote as regi the reported value of the
restrictiveness in terms of regulations of the generic country-year profile i = (c, t) and with conti
the corresponding value in terms of control. We define the nominal treatment categories looking
at the joint distribution of the two indicators. In particular, denoting as medReg and medCont the
median of the distribution of the regulations indicator and of the control one, respectively, we define
the treatment categories as follows
Definition 5 (Nominal Treatment Categories ). Individual treatment is obtained by applying the
following categorization criterion.
• Zi=LL if regi ≤ medReg and conti ≤ medCont: this category identifies profiles that are barely
restrictive with respect to the two mechanisms.
• Zi=HL if regi > medReg and conti ≤ medCont: this category detects profiles which implement
restrictive regulations but weak control strategies.
• Zi=LH if regi ≤ medReg and conti > medCont: this category indicates a welcoming attitude in
terms of regulations but intense control protocols.
• Zi=HH if regi ≥ medReg and conti ≥ medCont: this category denotes an highly restrictive
policy towards migrants with respect to both regulations and control.
23
Figure 5 provides a graphical idea of the previously described definition procedure. The left
subfigure shows the density distributions of the regulation and control indexes: their corresponding
median values are identified by dotted lines while black colored line represents the underlying
distribution of the whole immigration policy index which results by a weighted mean of the former
two (Helbling et al., 2017). The right subfigure shows the individual treatment collocation based
on their own values of the regulation and control indexes.
(a) Density distributions of regulation (violet line)
and control (blue line) indexes, and their respective
medians (dotted lines)
(b) Individual collocation in the treatment cate-
gories according to the regulation and control in-
dexes
Figure 5: Treatment Categories Definition
Hence, we deal with a K-valued individual treatment, where K = 4. Let us denote as Z = {Zct},
the (N × 1) multi-valued treatment vector where Zct ∈ {LL,HL,LH,HH}. Following Definition
5 and assuming the Influence Index as the ruling mechanism of dependencies, we explicit the
neighborhood treatment Gct as
Gct =

GctLL
GctHL
GctLH
GctHH
 =

∑
c′∈Nct Icc′,tδAc′t∑
c′∈Nct Icc′,tδHLc′t∑
c′∈Nct Icc′,tδLHc′t∑
c′∈Nct Icc′,tδHHc′t
 ,
where δLLc′t, δHLc′t, δLHc′t, , δHHc′t are dummy variables such that δLLc′t = 1 if Zc′,t = LL and 0
otherwise; δHLc′t = 1 if Zc′,t = HL and 0 otherwise; δLHc′t = 1 if Zc′,t = LH and 0 otherwise;
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δHHc′t = 1 if Zc′t = HH and 0 otherwise. Consequently, the potential outcomes are defined as
Yct(Zct,Gct). Figure 6 displays the distribution of the neighborhood treatment variable under the
hypothesis of equal contribution to the Influence index of the cultural and geographical subcompo-
nents, (α = β = 12).
(a) Tridimensional scatterplot of the neighborhood
treatment variable
(b) Density distribution of the singular components
that constitutes Gct
Figure 6: Neighborhood Treatment, α = β = 12
In order to estimate the causal effects of interest, we follow the estimation procedure described
in Section 2.
3.5 Joint Multiple Generalized Propensity Score (JMGPS) Estimation
We estimate the two components of JMGPS (see Definition 2), that is the individual propensity
score and the neighborhood propensity score.
3.5.1 Individual Propensity Score
The individual propensity score φ(z;xz) is the individual probability of receiving an individual
treatment z conditioning on unit-level baseline covariates. If the individual treatment is a categorical
variable with K nominal categories the estimation strategy consists in fitting a model for categorical
responses. Here we use the Multinomial Logit Model (Agresti (2018); Long et al. (2006) and Menard
(2002)), where the reference category is set to ”LL”, that is,
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P (Zi = LL) =
1
1 +
∑
z 6=LL expβzX
z
i
,
P (Zi = HL) =
expβHLX
z
i
1 +
∑
z 6=LL expβzX
z
i
,
P (Zi = LH) =
expβLHX
z
i
1 +
∑
z 6=LL expβzX
z
i
,
P (Zi = LH) =
expβHHX
z
i
1 +
∑
z 6=LL expβzX
z
i
.
Given the vector of estimated parameters θ̂z = {β̂HL ∪ β̂LH ∪ β̂HH}, we denote the estimated
individual propensity score corresponding to the actual treatment Zi as Φ̂i = φ(Zi;X
z
i ; θ̂
z). We
include in Xzi the whole set of covariates X we have described in Section 3.2. Figures 7a and 7b
provide a graphical intuition of the marginal and joint distribution of predicted propensity scores.
(a) Histograms of φ(LL;Xzi ; θ̂
LL) (green),
φ(HL;Xzi ; θ̂
HL)(yellow), φ(LH;Xzi ; θ̂
LH)(orange),
φ(HH;Xzi ; θ̂
HH) (red) and φ(Zi;X
z
i ; θ̂
z)
(b) Tridimensional scatterplot of φ(LL;Xzi ; θ̂
LL),
φ(HL;Xzi ; θ̂
HL) and φ(LH;Xzi ; θ̂
LH). Colors refer
to φ(HH;Xzi ; θ̂
HH)
Figure 7: Individual propensity score
3.5.2 Neighborhood Propensity Score
In the considered empirical scenario, the neighborhood treatment is a quadrivariate continuous
variable, Gct.
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We first apply a transformation on each component of the neighborhood multi treatment (more
details can be found in the Appendix C) so that, after the transformation, we can state that the
obtained variables G∗i,z follow a normal distribution. Specifically, the four transformed components
jointly follow a quadrivariate-normal distribution:
G∗i ∼MN (µG∗i ,ΣG∗),
where the vector of the means µG∗i depends on the individual treatment and on units’ covariates
through some parameters,
µG∗i =
[
µG∗i,LL , µG
∗
i,B1
, µG∗i,B2 , µG
∗
i,C
]
[
αG∗LL + β
T
G∗LL
Xgi + β
T
G∗LL
Zi, αG∗HL + β
T
G∗HL
Xgi + β
T
G∗HL
Zi,
αG∗LH + β
T
G∗LH
Xgi + β
T
G∗LH
Zi, αG∗HH + β
T
G∗HH
Xgi + β
T
G∗HH
Zi
]
and the variance-covariates matrix looks like
ΣG∗ =

σ2G∗LL
ρ(G∗LL,G
∗
HL)
σG∗LLσG
∗
HL
ρ(G∗LL,G
∗
LH)
σG∗LLσG
∗
LH
ρ(G∗LL,G
∗
HH)
σG∗LLσG
∗
HH
ρ(G∗LL,G
∗
HL)
σG∗LLσG
∗
HL
σ2G∗HL
ρ(G∗HL,G
∗
LH)
σG∗HLσG
∗
LH
ρ(G∗HL,G
∗
HH)
σG∗HLσG
∗
HH
ρ(G∗LL,G
∗
LH)
σG∗LLσG
∗
LH
ρ(G∗HL,G
∗
LH)
σG∗HLσG
∗
LH
σ2G∗LH
ρ(G∗LH ,G
∗
HH)
σG∗LHσG
∗
HH
ρ(G∗LL,G
∗
HH)
σG∗LLσG
∗
HH
ρ(G∗HL,G
∗
HH)
σG∗HLσG
∗
HH
ρ(G∗LH ,G
∗
HH)
σG∗LHσG
∗
HH
σ2G∗HH
 .
We fit Multivariate Multiple Linear Regression Model, (Davis (1982),Duchesne and De Micheaux
(2010)), regressing the (transformed) unit neighborhood treatment G∗i on the individual treatment
Zi and on the predictors that are candidate to influence the neighborhood treatment, X
g
i . Here we
include as explanatory variables Xgi the whole set of characteristics X , the individual treatment Zi
and a measure of vertex centrality. This procedure determines µ̂G∗i .
The variance-covariance matrix is estimated looking at the residuals of the model. In particular, we
first compute residuals of the model and, then, we estimate the variance and covariance matrix of
the residuals Σ̂G∗ , that results to be an unbiased estimator of ΣG∗ . Therefore, the neighborhood
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propensity score corresponds to the quantity
Λ̂(g; z,Xgi ) =
1
(2pi)
3
2
∣∣Σ̂G∗∣∣ 12 exp
[
− 1
2
(
g − µ̂G∗
)T
Σ̂
−1
G∗
(
g − µ̂G∗
)T]
.
4 Empirical Results
In this section, we illustrate the main empirical findings of this work 4. We evaluate the impact of
immigration policies on crime rates evaluating pairwise comparisons between the four treatment
levels. To assess the robustness of results with respect to different assumptions on the influence
structure, we check the following configurations of the Influence Inputs Weights (IIW): i) α = β = 12 ,
(gc): both geographical proximity and cultural similarity shape dependencies between units, and
contribute in determining the influence index with equal weight; ii) α = 1, β = 0, (g): only
geographical proximity drives interference; iii) α = 0, β = 1, (c): the influence structure depends
on cultural similarity only and iv) α = 0, β = 0, (noint): no interference mechanism comes into play.
Figures 8 graphically shows the main empirical results, which are numerically reported in Table
1. The general conclusion is that severe approaches towards immigration imply higher crime rates,
compared with a welcoming political receipt. This finding holds when the comparison is with strate-
gies with restrictive regulations only (HL-LL), systems where only control protocols are particularly
strict (LH-LL) and profiles adopting a restrictive legislative plan in terms of both regulations and
control mechanisms (HH-LL). If we look at how results changes with different definitions of the
influence weights, we can state that ignoring the possible spillover mechanism (noint) leads to a
downward bias in the estimates. This conclusion is stable in all the contrasts of interest. On the
contrary, allowing for the presence of interference increases the size of the effects. In particular,
introducing the cultural similarity in the mechanism of dependencies enhances the effects’ intensi-
ties (c). Geographical proximity mitigates the impact of interference on results, but also assuming
that geography is the only prompter of the spillover mechanism steers to stronger conclusions, com-
pared to the no-interference scenario (g and gc). These considerations hold in all the considered
comparisons.
4Here, we just present conclusions about the causal effects of interest, more detailed results about the models
we implemented in the whole analysis can be found in the Appendix F. Descriptives about included covariates are
provided by Appendix D.
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Figure 8: Direct Treatment Effects: point estimates and 95% Confidence intervals. Colors signal the
different assumption about interference: gc(lightblue), g(green), c(red), noint(purple)
Table 1: Direct Treatment Effects for the contrasts of interest: point estimates and 95% Confidence
intervals
Effects of Interest
IIW HL-LL LH-LL HH-LL
(α, β)
( 1
2
, 1
2
) 0.17774 *** 0.24439 *** 0.21145 ***
(0.17501;0.18008) (0.24246;0.24618) (0.20907;0.21409)
(1, 0) 0.03281 *** 0.1867 *** 0.0451 ***
(0.02768;0.03721) (0.18308;0.19007) (0.04062;0.05006)
(0, 1) 0.17778 *** 0.25819 *** 0.20191 ***
(0.17483;0.1803) (0.2561;0.26012) (0.19934;0.20476)
(0, 0) 0.08228 *** 0.11245 *** 0.00647 ***
(0.07842;0.08657) (0.10927;0.11517) (0.00213;0.01038)
As we fully discuss in Appendix E, these results are robust to different specifications of the multi-
valued treatment ( we introduce an alternative definition of the multi-valued treatment collapsing
the LH and HL categories into one M category ).
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5 Concluding Remarks and Discussion
This work extends the existing framework of causal inference under interference allowing for a multi-
valued treatment and for an interference structure shaped through a weighted network. This is a very
common setting that can be found in a wide wide ensemble of applications. For example, political
science often deals with policy evaluation settings with a multi-valued strategy, as treatments vary
across multiple dimensions, so calling for an high level of complexity. Here we evaluate the effect of
the national immigration policy on the crime rate. Given the multi-valued nature of the individual
treatment, the neighborhood exposure cannot be summarized by a single measure, as in the binary
setting. Our idea is to introduce a multi-valued network exposure, where each unit is exposed to
their neighbors’ treatment, weighted by the strength of their interaction. Information about the
whole exposure mapping is depicted by the Neighborhood Treatments Exposure Matrix (NTEM).
This framework implies an extended definition of the joint propensity score, called Joint Multiple
Generalized Propensity Score (JMGPS), which models a multi-valued individual treatment and
a multivariate neighborhood treatment. Direct effects of interest are pairwise comparisons of all
treatment levels and they are computed comparing imputed potential outcomes controlling for
the multi-valued network exposure. Our empirical results show that implementing a welcoming
immigration policy causes a reduction in the crime rate. These findings suggest that welcoming
immigration policies may contribute in reducing the social unrest between immigrants and natives.
One possible explanation is that adopting a legislative system, which allows migrants to be actively
involved in the hosting community, conceding them civil and social rights, encourages the integration
process and reduces frictions. Results also show that Ignoring multi-valued interference leads to
weaker estimates.
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A Proofs
A.1 Balancing property of JMGPS
We have to prove that
P (Zi = z,Gi = g|Xi) = P (Zi = z,Gi = g|ψ(z, g;Xi)).
The expression on the leften side exactly equals JMGPS, by definition, that is
P (Zi = z,Gi = g|Xi) = ψ(z, g;Xi).
We focus now on the righten side. By iterated equation we have that
P (Zi = z,Gi = g|ψ(z, g;Xi)) = EX
[
P (Zi = z,Gi = g|Xi, ψ(z, g;Xi))|ψ(z, g;Xi)
]
= EX
[
P (Zi = z,Gi = g|Xi)|ψ(z, g;Xi)
]
= EX
[
ψ(z, g;Xi)|ψ(z, g;Xi)
]
= ψ(z, g;Xi)
The second equality holds as the joint multiple generalized propensity score, by definition, is
functionally related to the characteristics Xi. The third equality follows from the definition of
JMGPS.
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Both above expressions are equal to the joint multiple propensity score itself and, hence, they
are also equal to each other.
A.2 Conditional unconfoundness of Di(z) and Gi given JMGPS
We have to show that
P (Di(z) = 1,Gi = g|Yi(z, g), ψ(z, g;Xi)) = P (Di(z) = 1,Gi = g|ψ(z, g;Xi)).
Righten side. We first focus on the expression that lies at the righten side. By the fact that
(Di(z) = 1) = (Zi = z) and Proposition 1, we have
P (Di(z) = 1,Gi = g|ψ(z, g;Xi)) = P (Zi = z,Gi = g|ψ(z, g;Xi)) = ψ(z, g;Xi).
Leften side. By iterated equations, we have
P (Di(z) = 1,Gi = g|Yi(z, g), ψ(z, g;Xi))
= EX
[
P
(
Di(z) = 1,Gi = g|Xi, ψ(z, g;Xi), Yi(z, g)
)|Yi(z, g), ψ(z, g;Xi)]
= EX
[
P
(
Di(z) = 1,Gi = g|Yi(z, g),Xi
)|Yi(z, g), ψ(z, g;Xi)]
= EX
[
P
(
Di(z) = 1,Gi = g|Xi
)|Yi(z, g), ψ(z, g;Xi)]
= EX
[
ψ(z, g;Xi)|Yi(z, g), ψ(z, g;Xi)] = ψ(z, g;Xi),
where the second equality is obtained taking into account that the joint multiple generalized propen-
sity score is a function of covariates, the third equality results from applying the Assumption 3,
while the forth equality holds recalling that (Di(z) = 1) = (Zi = z) and Definition 2.
A.3 Conditional unconfoundness of Di(z) and Gi given individual and neighbor-
hood propensity scores
We have to show that
P (Di(z) = 1,Gi = g|Yi(z, g), φ(z;Xzi ), λ(g; z,Xgi )) = P (Di(z) = 1,Gi = g|φ(z;Xzi ), λ(g; z,Xgi )),
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where φ(z;Xzi ) = P (Di(z) = 1|Xzi ) and λ(g; z,Xgi ) = P (Gi = g|Zi = z,Xgi ). We proceed showing
that both sides of the equation are equal to the joint multiple generalized propensity score.
Righten side. By iterated equations, we have
P (Di(z) = 1,Gi = g|φ(z;Xzi ), λ(g; z,Xgi ))
= EX
[
P (Di(z) = 1,Gi = g|Xi, φ(z;Xzi ), λ(g; z,Xgi ))|φ(z;Xzi ), λ(g; z,Xgi )
]
= EX
[
P (Di(z) = 1,Gi = g|Xi)|φ(z;Xzi ), λ(g; z,Xgi )
]
= EX
[
ψ(z, g;Xi)|φ(z;Xzi ), λ(g; z,Xgi )
]
= ψ(z, g;Xi).
The above equalities result from the fact that both φ(z;Xzi ) and λ(g; z,X
g
i ) are function of Xi
(second equality) and from the factorization ψ(z, g;Xi) = φ(z;X
z
i )λ(g; z,X
g
i ) (third equality).
Leften side. By iterated equations, we have
P (Di(z) = 1,Gi = g|Yi(z, g), φ(z;Xzi ), λ(g; z,Xgi ))
= EX
[
P (Di(z) = 1,Gi = g|Xi, Yi(z, g), φ(z;Xzi ), λ(g; z,Xgi ))|Yi(z, g), φ(z;Xzi ), λ(g; z,Xgi )
]
= EX
[
P (Di(z) = 1,Gi = g|Xi, Yi(z, g)|Yi(z, g), φ(z;Xzi ), λ(g; z,Xgi )
]
= EX
[
P (Di(z) = 1,Gi = g|Xi)|Yi(z, g), φ(z;Xzi ), λ(g; z,Xgi )
]
= EX
[
ψ(z, g;Xi)|Yi(z, g), φ(z;Xzi ), λ(g; z,Xgi )
]
= ψ(z, g;Xi),
where the second equality results from the fact that the two propensity scores are function of the
covariates, the third equality comes from Assumption 3, the fourth equality is obtained recalling
Definition 2 and that (Di(z) = 1) = (Zi = z) and, finally, the last equality follows from the
factorization of the JMGPS.
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B Influence Index detailed construction
The Influence index (I) is formally defined as
Icc′,t = α× IGcc′ + β × ICcc′,t
where IG denotes the geographical proximity indicator while IC states for the cultural similarity
indicator. The former is time invariant, while the latter provides a temporal variation. Here, we
discuss the detailed construction of these two indexes, which determine the interference structure.
We build up the geographical proximity index taking into account of two variables: a boundaries-
related variable and a geographical distance-related variable. The former, that we denote by Sp
counts the minimum number of states one needs to cross by, at the aim of reaching country c′
starting from country c. Thus, if we consider a graph collecting all the national states, this variable
represents the length of the shortest path between c and c′ 5. The latter, that we denote as Diststd
is a standardized measure of geographic distance between the most populated cities belonging to
the two countries. Formally, the geographical proximity indicator is computed as follows
IGcc′ = 0.5× 1
Spcc′
+ 0.5× (1−Diststdcc′ ) = 0.5×
1
Spcc′
+ 0.5× Proxstdcc′
On the other side, the cultural similarity indicator measures the level of cultural similarity between
two countries c and c′ at a given time t. We summarize this aspect evaluating the linguistic similarity
and the religious similarity, through the variables Ling and Relig. These measures have been defined
by the CEPII Linguistic Dataset Melitz and Toubal (2014) and CEPII Gravidata Dataset (Fouquin
et al. (2016)), respectively. The linguistic proximity indicator gives a unique measure of how much
the whole linguistic systems differ in the two countries, both in terms of the distribution of spoken
languages over the population and in terms of the linguistic roots. The religious similarity indicator
takes into account of the distribution of practised religions: an high value of this variable signals
5We assume that the pairs of countries France and Great Britain, Ireland and Great Britain share a common
boundary, as, even if they’re formally separated by the English Channel and the Irish Sea, respectively, they are very
near and connections are extremely simple
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an high similarity in terms of prevalence of the various religious communities at time t.
ICcc′,t = 0.5× Lingcc′,t + 0.5× Religcc′,t
Figure 9 shows the density distributions of the two indicators that contribute in determining the
Influence Index, as well as of their respective sub-components.
(a) Geographical Proximity Indicator (b) Cultural similarity Indicator
Figure 9: Influence index components density distributions
C Transformation of the NTEM components
We run some checks about the normality of the components Gi,z. The Shapiro Tests for Normality
(Shapiro and Wilk (1965)), separately conducted on the four components, Gi,LL, Gi,HL, Gi,LH ,
Gi,HH , rejects the Normality null-Hypothesis.
Hence, we decide to apply a transformation to each of the Gi,z. We conduct some tests experiment-
ing various transformation methods and we compare them selecting the best approach according
to the Pearson P statistic for Normality (divided by its degrees of freedom). We use repeated cross
validation to estimate the out-of-sample performance of all these methods. Figure 10a shows the
boxplots of the out of sample estimated normality statistics for all the techniques that we experi-
ment, over the four variables of interest (under α = 12 and β =
1
2). We find out that the method
that performed better in handling the Gi,z variables is the Ordered Quantile (ORQ) transformation,
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for all the various configurations of the II input weights. Figure 10b represents the tridimensional
scatterplot of trasformed variables.
(a) Best Normalizing methods: comparison (b) Tridimensional plot of trasformed variables
Figure 10: Best Normalizing method
Ordered Quantile trasformation (Bartlett (1947),Van der Waerden (1952))is based on ranks.
Essentially, the values of a variable, judged as a vector, are mapped to their percentile, and then to
the same percentile of the Standard Normal Distribution. As long as the number of ties is negligible,
this method guarantees that the transformed variable follows a Normal Distribution. Formally, each
variable Gi,z is transformed according to the following formula:
G∗i,z = Φ
−1
(
rank(Giz)
N + 1
)
,
where Φ is the cumulative density function of a Standard Normal distribution, N is the number of
observations. We denote as G∗i,z the variable resulting from the Ordered Quantile transformation.
D Descriptives
This paragraph provides some descriptives. Figure 1 shows the density distributions of the indi-
cators measuring the restrictiveness of regulations (Reg) and control strategies (Cont), over years.
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Regulations have become more welcoming over time while control strategies have turned to a more
severe attitude.
(a) Regulations indicator (b) Control indicator
Figure 11: Indicators measuring the restrictiveness of immigration policies over years
Figure 12 represents the variation of the distributions of the Reg (violet), Control (blue) and
ImPol (yellow) indicators in the 22 countries that we have included in the analysis.
Figure 12: Reg (violet), Control (blue) and ImPol (yellow) indicator, across countries
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Figure 13 consents to inspect the strictness of regulations and control implemented policies in
each country-year profile.
(a) Regulation indicator (b) Control indicator
Figure 13: Indicators of interest mapped over country-year profiles
Table 2 shows the basic descriptives of all the variables we have included in the analysis.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Var. Label N Mean St. dev Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Crime rate (every 10.000 inhab.) rate 612 1.326 0.636 0.000 0.910 1.560 3.430
Fertility rate ferrate 612 1.675 0.498 0.000 1.440 1.840 4.360
Power distributed to gender Index powgend 612 1.876 0.973 −0.854 1.408 2.394 3.714
Health equality Index eq health 612 2.418 0.588 0.612 1.972 2.775 3.792
Educational inequality Gini index (/60) ineq educ 612 0.269 0.163 0.000 0.149 0.361 0.893
Income inequality Gini index (/60) ineq inc 612 0.485 0.139 0.000 0.432 0.564 0.867
Equal access index eq access 612 0.871 0.137 0.290 0.856 0.945 0.986
Equal distribution of resources index eq resdist 612 0.924 0.070 0.588 0.908 0.964 0.986
Civil partecipation index civilpart 612 0.641 0.111 0.161 0.616 0.690 0.885
Access to justice index accjust 612 0.940 0.121 0.165 0.944 0.989 0.995
State ownership of economy index econcont 612 1.219 0.616 −0.536 0.890 1.636 2.731
Freedom of expression index freeexp 612 0.934 0.128 0.128 0.955 0.979 0.991
Freedom of religion index freerelig 612 1.958 0.751 −1.003 1.749 2.519 2.766
Life expectancy (/ 100) lifeexp 612 0.746 0.126 0.000 0.749 0.785 0.824
GDP per capita (/ 10.000) gdppc 612 2.666 1.154 0.610 1.954 3.373 8.192
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Figure 14 shows the tridimensional plot of the two indicators measuring the restrictiveness
towards migrants, and the corresponding the crime rate.
Figure 14: Tridimensional plot of the two indicators Reg and Cont, with respect to the Crime Rate.
E Results under different configurations of the treatment
This section shows results under alternative specifications of the treatment variable of interest. In
particular, as Definition 6 clarifies, we test two secondary ways of detecting the treatment categories.
Definition 6. Alternative specifications of the treatment variable Let us indicate ZKi a generic
treatment variable defined over K categories. We consider the following treatment classifications
1. Multi-valued treatment with three categories, Z
(3)
i , which have been defined collapsing the
categories HL and LH of the original individual treatment variable.
• Z3i =L if regi ≤ medreg and conti ≤ medcont: this category identifies profiles that are
barely restrictive with respect to the two mechanisms.
• Z3i =H if regi ≥ medreg and conti ≥ medcont: this category denotes an highly restrictive
policy towards migrants with respect to both regulations and control.
• Z3i =M otherwise 6
6note that the A and C categories exactly coincide with the A and C categories of the four-valued treatment
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2. Binary treatment with two categories, Z
(2)
i defined as follows
• Z2i =L if impoli ≤ medImPol
• Z2i =H if impoli > medImPol
Figure 15 graphically represents these two alternative treatment characterizations.
(a) Multi-valued with three categories, Z
(3)
i
(b) Binary with two categories, Z
(2)
i
Figure 15: Alternative definitions of the treatment variable
Table 3 shows results under these two definitions of the treatment variable. As it is immediate
to observe, these results are robust with the main findings of this paper.
Table 3: Results under different treatment definitions
Treatment categories
3 (L,M,H) 2 (L,H)
Effects of Interest Effects of Interest
IIW M-L H-L H-L
(α, β)
( 1
2
, 1
2
) 0.06648 *** 0.04986 *** 0.03875***
(0.06485;0.06815) (0.04774;0.05196) (0.01424;0.06133)
(1, 0) 0.04363 *** 0.01781 *** 0.04126 ***
(0.04203;0.04527) (0.01573;0.01987) (0.01686;0.06374)
(0, 1) 0.09282 *** 0.03523 *** 0.03587 ***
(0.09228;0.09338) (0.03452;0.03592) (0.01288;0.05705)
(0, 0) 0.0727 *** ’0.0008 0.03506***
(0.07027;0.07524) (-0.00386;0.00303) (0.01443;0.05789)
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Taking into consideration of a binary treatment ( which we obtain simply differentiating the
country-year profiles whose observed value of the general immigration policies indicator is above its
reference median ) still leads to positive results, regardless of the assumption about interference.
But in the last two scenarios, effects are significantly weaker.
F Models Results
F.1 Model for Z
Table 4: Model for the individual treatment Zi: multinomial logit
Dependent variable:
Zi
HL LH HH
(Intercept) 32.79243***(12.78648) -10.11091(15.25728) 80.91698(15.50048)
rate 0.16626(0.26154) 0.05287(0.2613) 0.69135(0.43628)
ferrate 2.58746***(0.96028) -1.67848(1.06485) 4.32561***(1.12471)
powgend -3.09196***(0.49015) 0.714(0.41834) -0.54734(0.51338)
eq health 0.10112(0.69408) 2.75906***(0.78272) 4.62427***(1.1305)
ineq educ -2.09696(2.33622) 5.29634***(2.39962) -10.3432***(2.70765)
ineq inc 5.32876***(2.59477) -9.08242***(2.35931) 10.89922***(3.40414)
eq access 28.56299***(5.5844) -5.09848(6.35618) 31.06497***(7.08197)
eq redist -40.91293***(12.89674) -38.18629***(16.62724) -114.90727***(19.31919)
civilpart -9.59618***(2.78319) 5.08124***(2.47201) -6.36655(4.05762)
accjust -1.89435(9.22897) -5.28742(10.20244) -75.66229***(12.17123)
ecocont 0.42103(0.29668) -0.02385(0.3009) -0.00473(0.41129)
freexp -15.37981**(7.11022) 45.12384***(11.12141) 46.82842***(10.41181)
freerelig 1.26604***(0.57401) 0.68092(0.62653) -0.2062(0.74503)
lifexp 2.02242(2.7095) 6.54206***(2.64635) 12.97523***(5.51876)
gdppc -0.8286***(0.21716) -0.14708(0.17659) -0.15251(0.2456)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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F.2 Model for G
Table 5: Models for the neighborhood treatment Gi: multivariate linear model
Dependent variable:
G∗
Statistic Statistic Statistic
Omnibus Effect 35.31*** 38.27*** 41.42***
(Intercept) 21.63 *** 28.17*** 9.79***
Zi 12.09 *** 14.62*** 9.81***
rate 2.71 ** 4.80 ** 0.91
ferrate 18.01 *** 20.04 *** 14.95 ***
powgend 3.76 *** 6.22 *** 3.44 ***
eq health 6.61 *** 12.35*** 2.34 ***
ineq educ 0.38 0.07 5.43***
ineq inc 11.17 *** 11.28 *** 8.85***
eq access 7.81*** 12.64*** 3.32 ***
eq resdist 15.75 *** 24.51*** 4.97***
civilpart 16.13 *** 18.06*** 14.58 ***
accjust 20.43 *** 21.78 *** 12.37
econcont 16.66 *** 16.39 *** 20.85 ***
freeexp 15.85 *** 16.85 *** 9.86 ***
freerelig 14.43 *** 13.58 *** 18.86 ***
lifeexp 1.01 0.64 4.51 ***
gdppc 191.40 *** 196.56*** 180.59 ***
Vertex centr 72.79 *** 81.82 *** 124.79 ***
IIW
α 1/2 1 0
β 1/2 0 1
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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F.3 Models for Y
Table 6: Models for Y: linear model with time fixed effects
Dependent variable:
Y
Zi,HL 0.18591**(0.08543) 0.04817(0.09693) 0.1866**(0.07333)
Zi,LH 0.25183**(0.08896) 0.20069**(0.08139) 0.26622***(0.08028)
Zi,HH 0.20918*(0.11826) 0.04082(0.08269) 0.19946*(0.11675)
G∗i,LL -0.44931(0.32531) 0.46268(0.32837) -0.92524***(0.28568)
G∗i,HL -0.26138(0.35755) -1.4981**(0.58176) -0.00591(0.22521)
G∗i,LH 0.9401**(0.47619) 1.80662***(0.53027) 0.33123(0.3205)
G∗i,HH 1.46947***(0.36545) 0.55599(0.36047) 1.05639***(0.3828)
φ(zi;X
z
i ) -0.07777(0.06924) -0.14616**(0.07232) -0.08396(0.0706)
λ(gi; zi,X
g
i ) 0.33052(**0.16081) 0.36958**(0.15836) 0.05239(0.14535)
IIW
α 1/2 1 0
β 1/2 0 1
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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